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The past few decades have witnessed the reconﬁguration of a sweep of industries and sectors to more
closely mirror economic models, often interpreted as a hallmark of neoliberal reordering in the grow-
ing body of scholarship on the topic. Analyses have emphasized not simply the primacy of market
designs in these transformations, but also their performative force: the degree to which they bring
into being the phenomena they would seem to merely describe. While studies have begun to probe
how transformations are effected through market devices, less attention has been directed toward
understanding the conditions under which performative properties take hold, or are confounded. This
article outlines recent shifts in the operations of a commercial salmon ﬁshery in southwest Alaska in
order to examine how broader modes of industry restructuring are accomplished, at least in part,
through the material reworking of everyday objects and actions, such as market goods and the
practices through which they are produced and consumed. It demonstrates that the abstract designs
that inform ﬁshery change, including rationalization and niche-marketing efforts, emerge not merely
from the minds of economic analysts but also, and perhaps even more consequentially, through
the material reconﬁguration of ﬁsh ﬂesh. At the same time, ethnographic evidence from southwest
Alaska reveals the limits of performative reordering as well: Salmon ﬁshers and their products
are never very smoothly remade in the image of market models. The article argues that market mate-
rialities thus constitute both vehicles for and disruptions to the worldly realizations of neoliberal
designs.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Recent scholarship in economic sociology, geography, and re-
lated ﬁelds has pursued new lines of inquiry following what has
been dubbed the ‘‘performative turn.’’ Generally linked to Michel
Callon’s inﬂuential edited volume The Laws of the Markets (1998),
the performativity perspective makes a case for how economics
‘‘performs, shapes, and formats the economy’’ rather than simply
observing it—how it actually brings into being the phenomena it
would seem to merely describe (Callon, 1998, 2). Inspired by this
view and the theoretical commitments that underlie it, including
those of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), a growing body of literature
examines the role of everyday artifacts, tools, and procedures in
realizing economic models. This work emphasizes that markets
do not spring whole cloth from the minds of economists, but in-
stead are built through what Fabian Muniesa, Yuval Millo, and Mi-
chel Callon term ‘‘market devices,’’ theorized as ‘‘the material anddiscursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of mar-
kets’’ (2007, 2).1 Underscoring the signiﬁcance of materiality for
market processes, case studies explore how items such as the shop-
ping cart, a ﬁnancial pricing model, or the stock ticker constitute
market devices insofar as they conﬁgure interactions, equip prac-
tices, and create new modes of calculation (Grandeclément and
Cochoy, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006; Preda, 2006).
This focus on market devices and their performative properties
has opened important analytical avenues, yet less attention has
been directed to the conditions under which such properties take
hold, or are confounded. Although Callon (2010) emphasizes the
rarity and fragility of the arrangements that result in performative
effects, studies employing the notion of the market device tend to
focus on successful performances. This leaves unanswered ques-
tions about why certain economic models seem to smoothly recon-
ﬁgure the world in their image, while others gain little traction,g (2008),
concept.
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or mixed results may thus prove illuminating.2 As Judith Butler ob-
serves, the mechanisms that enable success may be most visible dur-
ing moments of breakdown or disruption, and ‘‘if certain operations
of performativity fail, then it is useful to know when and why they
do, and whether they ought to’’ (2010, 154). Given the proliferation
of economic models deployed to advance neoliberal agendas, these
are pressing questions.
In this article, I engage such questions by offering a crisper con-
ceptualization of how the materialities of market devices both
shape and limit economic transformation. I do so through an anal-
ysis of a decade-long period of change in a commercial salmon
ﬁshery in southwest Alaska, focusing on the divergent fates of dif-
ferent market-oriented interventions to address an economic
downturn, which was most acute in the early to mid-2000s. Since
that time, various industry actors have developed and debated
industry recovery efforts. These include proposals to revamp ﬁsh-
eries regulation to encourage economic efﬁciency through resource
rationalization, as well as initiatives to alter products to more clo-
sely meet the quality speciﬁcations associated with growing sea-
food niche markets. While their tactics differ, these recovery
designs tend to converge in a common vision for a new kind of sal-
mon ﬁshery: one in which a sleeker, more precisely ﬁgured ﬁsh is
caught by a leaner, more market-savvy ﬂeet.
Drawing on long-term ethnographic research in the rural region
of Bristol Bay, I examine how economic restructuring is both
accomplished and stymied through the material reworking of
everyday objects and actions, including market goods and the prac-
tices through which they are produced and consumed.3 In Bristol
Bay, salmon industry change has been pursued through various ef-
forts to remake the ﬁsh themselves. I show how rationalization
and niche marketing projects engage market devices such as salmon
catch shares and ﬁllet quality standards to realize widely circulating
economic models. As these tools interact with the region’s ﬁsh prod-
ucts, practices, and politics, however, they reveal both the workings
and the failures of performative reordering. The proposed regulatory
tool of transferable salmon quotas has not remade the Bristol Bay
ﬁshery according to its logic, while new salmon speciﬁcations meant
to guarantee quality have begun to substantially reorient production,
though never quite as anticipated. Through an analysis of these
divergent outcomes, I argue that market materialities constitute
both vehicles for and disruptions to the worldly realizations of neo-
liberal designs.
The Bristol Bay case provides an especially fruitful vantage for
examining the signiﬁcance of materiality for economic processes.
It is not merely a window onto a market ‘‘made ﬂesh’’ in the sense
developed by Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2007)—that is, animated by
political-economic power and the strategic interests of social ac-
tors and institutions. Nor is it simply a site of economics ‘‘in the
wild’’ as conjured by Callon (see Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2003),
meaning the circulation of social-scientiﬁc precepts in real-world
contexts, outside the conﬁnes of the academy. The Bay is even
more straightforwardly ﬂeshy and wild: Its wild salmon runs have
especially unruly elements, and its market objects tend to be2 This takes up a longstanding emphasis by scholars contributing to science and
technology studies, from Bruno Latour’s (1996) focus on a failed French transit
system, to Andrew Pickering’s (1995) attention to how even the most abstract
scientiﬁc models are ‘‘mangled’’ in practice.
3 I have conducted ongoing anthropological ﬁeld research on the Alaska salmon
industry since 2002, including a two-year primary ﬁeldwork period from 2002 to
2004. During most of this time, I was based in the Bristol Bay hub community of
Dillingham, where the majority of the town’s 2300 residents identify as Alaska Native
(State of Alaska, 2013). My research followed commercial ﬁshers and other industry
players as they traveled between sites of salmon harvesting, processing, and
policymaking, taking them from Bristol Bay ﬁshing grounds to venues in Anchorage,
Seattle, and beyond.entangled with literal ﬁsh ﬂesh. In this article, I tease apart the
formation of market devices in Bristol Bay, and trace what happens
as they become entwined with the region’s pulsing salmon,
diverse ﬁshing practices, and messy ﬁsh politics. I conclude by
demonstrating how the matter of market devices introduces a
certain form of indeterminacy into the workings of markets
themselves.
2. Models, materiality, and market devices
Over the past few decades, innumerable industries and environ-
ments have been reconﬁgured to more closely mirror economic
models, often interpreted as a hallmark of neoliberal reordering
in the growing body of scholarship on the topic. Much of this has
been accomplished through the creation of new market objects,
such as carbon credits (Lohmann, 2005), ecosystem services priced
for sale (Robertson, 2012), and property titles introduced to
monetize informal economic activity (Mitchell, 2005, 2007). In
the ﬁsheries, rationalization designs have reconﬁgured ﬁsh
populations into items of individual ownership (Holm, 2007; Holm
and Nielsen, 2007), while other market-driven processes, such as
sustainable harvest certiﬁcation, have multiplied market relations
(Foley and Hébert, 2013). This reordering often involves extending
private property forms into new domains, which facilitates the
adoption of market-based regimes for economic change along
with the broader neoliberal agendas that presume and promote
them.
Recent work on market devices speaks to how such transforma-
tions take place. As Muniesa et al. (2007, 2–3) outline, the concept
is taken from Michel Foucault’s notion of the dispositif, translated
as ‘‘device’’ or ‘‘apparatus,’’ as well as from its elaboration by Gilles
Deleuze, who links the idea to his and Felix Guattari’s concept of
agencement, often translated as ‘‘assemblage,’’ which conveys
how agency itself emerges through such arrangements. In theoriz-
ing the dispositif, Foucault and Deleuze draw particular attention to
the composite nature of what Foucualt describes as a ‘‘thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble’’ (1980, 194) and Deleuze (2006, 338)
calls ‘‘a skein, a multilinear whole’’. To both, the concept of the de-
vice helps account for the connections that hold highly discontin-
uous elements together, which Deleuze (2006, 338) depicts in
metaphorical terms as the multiple moving, tangled lines of a ﬁsh-
ing operation. This focus on the joining of different and sometimes
divergent properties into a conﬁguration with transformative ef-
fects recalls the efforts of semiotic theorists to show how distinct
qualities become bundled together in the material forms that gen-
erate meaning. I elaborate on this feature of market devices to pro-
vide a fuller picture of how ‘‘the risk of breakdown and disruption
are constitutive to any and all performative operations’’ (cf. Butler,
2010, 152).
An expanding body of recent scholarship in anthropology con-
verges with ANT perspectives in its emphasis on materiality,
underscoring that even the most abstract visions must take mate-
rial form in order to exist in and move through the world (see
Miller, 2005). Some contributions draw on materialist semiotics
to highlight how any given form of signiﬁcation is not merely an
empty container for meaning but a material entity in its own right
(Keane, 2005, 2007; see also Reno, 2011; Hull, 2012). As Webb
Keane explains, the quality of redness, for example, can appear
only in the context of something red, but anything that ﬁts this
description also comes with other properties, such as an apple’s
spherical shape, sweet taste, and tendency to rot (2005, 187–
188). Insofar as market models are devices with material form,
they too carry with them a variety of sensuous entailments, includ-
ing those that speak to the contexts of their creation. The speciﬁca-
tions of quality salmon, for example, cannot be peeled apart from
the ﬁshery production conditions responsible for their bundling.
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markets (Keane, 2008) and modes of bureaucratic regulation (Hull,
2012). It suggests that even markets seen as especially abstract by
virtue of their ﬁnancial instruments rely on and reproduce the
moral narratives embedded in their material-semiotic forms
(Keane, 2008). Keane notes that while this may contribute to nat-
uralizing these markets’ authority, it invites their repudiation as
well, since the objectiﬁcation of abstract designs allows for their
explicit rejection (2008, 36–37). As Joshua Reno contends in his
study of clean energy promotion, such perspectives highlight
‘‘the role of market devices. . .in furthering neoliberal models of
the economic, as well as providing a means of contesting them’’
(2011, 391). Given the vagaries of concrete things in worldly circu-
lation, embedding state and market visions in material forms also
introduces the prospect that they may defy the intentions of those
who make or use them.
This explains how the very market devices that facilitate and
shape economic transformation simultaneously introduce ele-
ments of uncertainty and avenues for failure. As market devices
move across varied terrain, the properties that are brought to-
gether in their creation do not always mesh felicitously with the
arrangements they encounter.4 This accounts for why, despite a
number of parallels in the experience of the Alaska salmon sector
with that of other ﬁsheries worldwide, the Bristol Bay case suggests
a somewhat different story. Here, the materialities of the market de-
vices employed to spur rationalization and niche marketing bump
up against other kinds of obdurate matter, from existing property
forms in boats and ﬁshing permits, to the peculiar ecologies of Bris-
tol Bay salmon runs, to the conﬁgurations of backyard smokehouses
in a rural region where most residents identify as Alaska Native.
By attending to these factors, my argument provides a central
role for history and culture, if by treating them as assemblages
forged through prior work rather than essentialist features of
unchanging orders. A core tenet of the ANT approach is a rejection
of ‘‘context’’ or ‘‘the social’’ as an explanatory factor, in favor of a
focus on how interests, identities, and agentive capacities emerge
through the activity of socio-technical arrangements (Callon,
1998, Latour, 2007; see Asdal and Moser 2012 for a review). As a
result, many studies in this vein tend to disregard or even deny
so-called ‘‘‘backstage’ mechanisms, such as cultural-political-social
constructs or theoretical frameworks’’ (Cochoy, 2007, 110). Yet, as
Kristin Asdal and Ingunn Moser argue, while this focus on worlds-
in-the-making has generated a wealth of important scholarship, it
also risks limiting its analytical power by neglecting certain critical
dimensions altogether, including ‘‘layers of history, of situations,
cases or ﬁles folded into the new’’ (2012, 295). Following Asdal
and Moser, I engage in a certain kind of ‘‘contexting’’ in order to
provide a more careful analysis of how ‘‘new realities are made
and remade in material-semiotic practices’’ (2012, 302).3. Rationalization, Interrupted
3.1. The push for rationalization
Rationalization is one of the most prominent trends to have
shaped commercial ﬁsheries over the past few decades, particu-
larly in industrialized nations. An effort to orient resource regula-
tion toward economic efﬁciency, rationalization has become4 The idea of felicity conditions recalls the roots of the performativity concept in
theories of language, speciﬁcally Austin’s (1962) notion of the performative utterance,
which ‘‘says and does what it says simultaneously’’ (Cochoy, 1998, 218). ‘‘I thee wed,’’
‘‘I apologize,’’ or ‘‘I declare the meeting open’’ are classic examples. It is widely
recognized that performative utterances require certain ‘‘conditions of felicity’’ in
order to do what they say—the social authority of a meeting convener, for instance, or
the sincerity of a successfully staged apology (MacKenzie, 2007, 3).virtually synonymous in the ﬁsheries context with ‘‘rights-based’’
management, which involves assigning something akin to a prop-
erty right over a certain portion of the catch. These measures have
generated sharp controversy in most settings in which they have
been applied, leading Holm and Neilsen to ask how property rights
manage to ‘‘stick to slippery ﬁsh’’ in the Norwegian cod sector
(2007, 178). In Bristol Bay, however, most of the more recent cam-
paigns to rationalize salmon ﬁsheries have failed, with ﬁrst-step
proposals for rights-based approaches barely making it onto the
books, even during economic crisis. The Alaska case thus prompts
questions about how salmonmanages to evade ensnarement in the
apparatus that has successfully enclosed so many of its sea-
swimming cousins. As this section explains, the answer lies at least
in part in the uneasy ﬁt between the market devices that now
replicate rights-based regimes and enduring practices of Alaskan
salmon ﬁshing and ﬁsheries management. In particular, the exist-
ing salmon permit system, established in the 1970s during an ear-
lier wave of rationalization, enmeshes commercial salmon ﬁshing
in ownership arrangements that complicate the adoption of more
recent rationalization tools.
As resource economists recount, Alaska’s salmon ﬁsheries were
an early proving ground for the integration of neoclassical eco-
nomic principles into resource management. According to James
E. Wilen, the decade following World War II saw growing evidence
of overﬁshing worldwide along with the rise of theories in both
biology and economics that provided rationales for limiting entry
into open-access ﬁsheries (2000, 307). Preﬁguring work on the
so-called tragedy of the commons, economists Anthony Scott and
H. Scott Gordon argued in the mid-1950s that economic waste
was a direct consequence of open-access regimes, contending that
programs to limit access, such as ﬁshing permit systems, could pre-
vent rent dissipation (Wilen, 2000, 307). Nevertheless, the handful
of entry limitation programs that were adopted in the 1960s and
1970s were driven more by biological goals than by economic
agendas (Wilen, 2000, 308, 314). Indeed, Alaska instituted its Lim-
ited Entry permit system for statewide commercial salmon ﬁshing
in 1973, during a period of poor salmon returns. Limited Entry re-
stricts the right to ﬁsh to the owners of transferable, state-issued
permits for particular regions.
While entry limitation programs in Alaska and elsewhere are of-
ten credited with improving ﬁsh stocks and biological manage-
ment, economists soon grew disenchanted with these early
rationalization efforts. Permit systems did little to address the rent
dissipation they identiﬁed as the chief problem of open access re-
gimes (Wilen, 2000, 314–316). Economists who have analyzed
Alaska’s salmon ﬁsheries under Limited Entry observe that it allows
for more permit holders and thus larger ﬂeets than are needed to
harvest available salmon, and they point out that the cost of oper-
ating large ﬂeets lessens total industry proﬁts (e.g., Knapp, 2002a;
Link et al., 2003). They further note that because boats compete un-
der the ﬁsheries’ derby-style format—which limits ﬁshing to dis-
crete time periods during which boats must ‘‘race for ﬁsh’’—the
permit system creates more incentive for individual ﬁshers to make
capital investments to help them out-ﬁsh one another, rather than
increase the total value of the catch. Nowhere is this more dramat-
ically illustrated than in Bristol Bay, most industry participants
agree, where crowds of souped-up boats battle it out for proﬁts that
dwindle when salmon prices are low. Such details informed broad
public discussion during the downturn of the early to mid-2000s,
when there was considerable talk of overhauling the ﬁsheries’ ‘‘out-
datedmanagement’’ (Jung, 2002, 24). From the perspective of econ-
omists who trace the ﬁsheries’ problems to ‘‘incomplete’’ property
rights, permit programs represent an incomplete form of rationali-
zation, one that does not go far enough in assigning individual
property rights to a commonly held resource (Wilen, 2000, 314–
316)—hence their push for rights-based management regimes.
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ﬁsheries management are rooted in claims about private property
and its effects. The primary tool of this model is the individual ﬁsh-
ing quota (IFQ), or individual transferable quota (ITQ) in its more
fully marketized form. These quotas are often referred to as ‘‘catch
shares’’ in Alaska and elsewhere. ITQs or catch shares represent a
certain percentage of a ﬁshery’s total allowable catch, usually ex-
pressed as amounts of ﬁsh poundage. They are allocated to an indi-
vidual or group who then owns saleable rights to catch that
quantity of the resource. According to the rights-based model, ITQs
will lead to the most efﬁcient and rent-seeking harvesting prac-
tices possible, especially in comparison to resource regimes that al-
low for more open access. For example, individual ﬁshers with ITQs
would, in theory, adopt the best gear type and ﬁshing techniques
for fast-changing ﬁshery and market conditions; work to conserve
the resource that they now had exclusive rights over; and buy and
sell ITQs freely, allowing more proﬁtable ﬁshers to expand their
businesses and struggling producers to exit the industry, stream-
lining the ﬁshing ﬂeet in turn (see Holm, 2007, 236).
ITQs thus represent a quintessential market device, a calculative
mechanism derived from neoclassical economics that reorganizes
ﬁsheries to more closely correspond with the neoliberal vision, as
Holm (2007) and Holm and Nielsen (2007) also suggest. Indeed,
ITQs have long graduated from a theoretical construct. Worldwide,
scores of ﬁsheries have been reorganized through them, and rights-
based approaches have been vigorously championed as a solution
for the world’s ﬁshery problems—so much so that they have be-
come both ‘‘ubiquitous’’ and ‘‘hegemonic’’ in many ﬁshery settings
(Macinko and Bromley, 2004, 623).
By the early 2000s, many Bristol Bay salmon producers were
well acquainted with rationalization and the tool of catch shares.
An ITQ program had been put into place for federally managed
sableﬁsh and halibut ﬁsheries off the coast of Alaska in 1995 and
for pollock in 1998. Some Bristol Bay salmon ﬁshers held quota
in these other ﬁsheries. Moreover, the many public discussions
aimed at ‘‘solving Alaska’s salmon crisis’’ (Salmon Tools, 2007) in
the early to mid-2000s unfolded amid the steady rationalization
of federally managed crab ﬁsheries not far offshore. Within these
forums, ﬁsheries stakeholders mulled over the details of salmon
catch share proposals along with other tools intended to improve
the ﬁsheries’ economic efﬁciency. Nevertheless, as I detail below,
rights-based salmon management programs were never imple-
mented in Bristol Bay. Instead, more extensive rationalizationmea-
sures were met with bitter contestation and only limited
application over a decade-long period of change.
3.2. Protesting permit stacking
In December of 2012, a diverse group that included commercial
ﬁshers, policymakers, resource managers, and rural residents gath-
ered in the Bristol Bay community of Naknek to discuss proposed
changes to salmon ﬁsheries regulation. This meeting of the Alaska
Board of Fisheries was held in the local school auditorium, a large
space with painted murals depicting local canneries and ﬁshing
boats. As temperatures outside sank well below freezing, the Board
heard public testimony about a particularly controversial suite of
proposals involving ‘‘permit stacking’’, a mechanism for ﬁsheries
rationalization that had been vigorously debated over the prior
decade. Referring to the use of multiple permits on a single ﬁshing
operation, permit stacking is a way to make commercial ﬁshing
operations more economically efﬁcient. It was typically associated
with broader trends of ﬂeet consolidation, an outcome that ﬁshery
participants mostly feared though sometimes welcomed, depend-
ing on how this whittling down of existing operations was ex-
pected to take place. Given the stakes at hand, permit stacking
has been a hot-button issue in Bristol Bay since 2003, when, inthe depths of the downturn, the Board introduced one form of it
into the ﬁshery.
At that point in the early 2000s, the economic future of Alaska’s
salmon ﬁsheries seemed uncertain, even with its strong wild sal-
mon populations. The industry had plummeted from high proﬁt-
ability in the 1980s to near insolvency, with salmon prices
hovering at historic lows. Processing companies shuttered facilities
across Alaska, commercial ﬁshers saw incomes evaporate, and rur-
al ﬁshing regions reeled. Economic analysts have attributed this
sharp downturn in salmon prices most notably to the exponential
growth in farmed salmon production since the early 1980s (Knapp
et al., 2007). Salmon farming, or aquaculture, has been illegal in
Alaska since the late 1980s, but overseas it was expanding rapidly.
In particular, the movement of aquaculture operations to cheaper
production sites in Chile in the 1980s led to direct price competition
for Alaska salmon in some of its most critical markets (Anderson,
1997).
The permit stacking policy adopted in 2003 was proposed as a
way to enable struggling permit holders to team up on a single
ﬁshing vessel and split expenses. Its advocates noted the added
beneﬁt of potentially stemming rent dissipation by, in ﬁsheries lin-
go, ‘‘taking gear out of the water,’’ since the two harvesters would
be using less net in their combined operation than if both of them
were ﬁshing on their own. Despite these seemingly benign aims,
the measure provoked strenuous protest from large segments of
the ﬂeet. Opponents of the measure decried the unequal ﬁshing
rights afforded to ‘‘D’’ vessels, those with dual permits that could
use longer nets.
To be clear, the permit stacking policy required the two permit
holders to be aboard during ﬁshing and barred any single permit
holder from ﬁshing multiple permits at the same time. But many
ﬁshery participants saw the new measure as a ﬁrst step toward
more sweeping rationalization policies that would institutionalize
unequal classes of ﬁshers. Indeed, the policy quickly spurred a
number of permit holders to expand their individual operations:
some who could afford it bought additional permits in the name
of family members so they could ﬁsh with longer nets. Others took
advantage of a change in state law around the same time to pur-
chase an additional permit in their own name, anticipating that
one day permit stacking might be broadened to allow a single har-
vester the right to accumulate and ﬁsh multiple permits. In 2003,
one ﬁsher who argued against permit stacking described the pol-
icy, in metaphorical terms, as the ﬁrst cut into a forest that would
pave the way for later clearing.
Yet this seemingly inexorable drive toward more extensive
rationalization of the salmon ﬁshery has not yet materialized.
The industry has recovered considerably over the past decade,
which is partly credited to the successful reconﬁguration of the
Alaska salmon sector to make and market ﬁsh for more lucrative
market segments (Knapp, 2013). All the while, the permit stacking
issue has remained divisive. During the 2006 Board meeting there
was so much disagreement about it that all discussions on the to-
pic were tabled for three years, when most similar measures were
narrowly voted down. Each time, harvesters from the Bristol Bay
region expressed concern about some of the same outcomes that
resource economists associate with positive ends of economic efﬁ-
ciency: that ﬁshing rights would migrate to the hands of more
powerful players. For Bristol Bay residents, this prospect was pre-
ﬁgured all too closely by the existing trend involving the ‘‘outmi-
gration’’ of ﬁshing permits from rural regions through sale and
transfer, evident since the beginning of the Limited Entry system
(Langdon, 1980; Kamali, 1984; Oakley, 1989). While the permit
stacking measure that was put into place in 2003 remains in effect,
the Board removed another in 2012, swayed by impassioned testi-
mony from Bristol Bay residents who had been disadvantaged by
the policy, along with economic research documenting these
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tling about, but minimal regulatory change toward, ﬁsheries ratio-
nalization in Bristol Bay over the past ten years.
3.3. Slipping past the ITQ spparatus
The failure of rights-based policies to take hold in Bristol Bay is
noteworthy given their proliferation across countless ﬁsheries in
the global North. As indicated earlier, ﬁsheries participants around
the world have vigorously resisted the implementation of quota
systems (Helgason and Pálsson, 1998, 1997), as documented by
an expanding body of scholarship on the social shifts and exclu-
sions that accompany what is often characterized as ﬁsheries priv-
atization.5 Important work in Alaska shows how federal ﬁsheries
rationalization has contributed to the dispossession of individuals
and rural communities from longtime ﬁshing livelihoods (Carothers,
2010; Lowe and Carothers, 2008). Yet, as Holm points out, even in
the face of opposition and social dislocation, ITQs nevertheless tend
to ‘‘work’’: They are often easily implemented and reconﬁgure entire
ﬁshing economies with remarkable speed and efﬁcacy (2007, 237).
Holm illustrates this point by describing a telling turn of events
in the Norwegian cod ﬁshery. After the Norwegian government
ofﬁcially rejected the ITQ model following public uproar, it became
integrated into everyday ﬁshing practice anyway. Unofﬁcial mar-
kets sprung up as ﬁshers informally traded quota shares, bringing
into being what economists had envisioned (Holm, 2007; Holm
and Nielsen, 2007). Yet according to Holm, the seamless material-
ization of the ITQ model reveals less about the inherent truth of
neoclassical economics and more about the success of the ‘‘invisi-
ble revolution,’’ the prior transformation of ﬁsh into calculable ob-
jects (2007, 238–239). By this, Holm refers to how in the second
half of the twentieth century ﬁsh were widely reconceptualized
as the interchangeable elements of discrete biological populations,
subject to quantiﬁcation and distribution through the tools of sci-
ence (Holm, 2001, see also Bavington, 2010). Once ﬁsh become
individual units of an abstract total allowable catch that can be
rationally divvied up by managerial expertise, Holm contends,
the leap to quota systems is rather small (Holm, 2007, 240).
Holm makes a compelling argument. Yet the Alaska case sug-
gests that the material reorganization of the invisible revolution
cannot fully account for the uptake or rejection of rationalization
designs. Alaska salmon, like the Norwegian cod Holm describes,
has long been transﬁgured into ‘‘a resource ﬁt for management’’
(2007, 236–237).6 Salmon are tagged, measured, and counted so
that state biologists can calculate the expected size of the run and
the desired ‘‘escapement,’’ the number of salmon that need to reach
spawning grounds in order to maintain the population, then used to
determine legal ﬁshing periods. As these details conﬁrm, Bristol Bay
ﬁsh, like those in Norway, have been transformed ‘‘from a wild crea-
ture of the sea into a complex, cyborglike, scaled and modeled en-
tity’’ (Holm, 2007, 236–237). So if salmon themselves have been
readied for rationalization, why, then, is there no quota system in
Bristol Bay?
It is tempting to suggest that Alaska salmon has evaded the
catch-share device because of the material particularities of the
ﬁsh itself. Indeed, in the discussions of the early 2000s, even strong
proponents of rights-based management recognized that assigning
quotas to individual vessels would be complicated for wild salmon
ﬁsheries. Salmon is anadramous, meaning that it is born in fresh
water, migrates to ocean environments to mature, and then re-
turns to its natal streams, rivers, and lakes to spawn and, in the
case of Paciﬁc salmon, to die. This results in the annual migration5 See Carothers and Chambers (2012) for a review.
6 See Hébert (2010) for a further discussion of how Alaska salmon is made
calculable.of salmon runs, or returns, to Alaskan waters. The spectacle is espe-
cially dramatic in Bristol Bay, which is home to the world’s largest
runs of the sockeye salmon species as well as one of the most com-
pressed salmon seasons. The majority of the Bay’s tens of millions
of ﬁsh return in about a two-week period each summer, in an
unpredictable frenzy of ﬁts and starts that presents challenges
for ﬁshers, processers, and resource managers alike.
Yet the materiality of wild salmon hardly determines against
ITQs. Cod populations often display migratory behavior, and ITQs
have been adopted for countless cod ﬁsheries. Indeed, advocates
for rights-based salmon management in the early 2000s pointed
out that biologists generally concur that it would be possible to
manage Paciﬁc salmon ﬁsheries under a quota system, even in a
place like Bristol Bay. The biology and life history of the species
may not invite easy rationalization, but the fate of catch-share pro-
posals there likely lies in other embodied aspects of salmon ﬁshing.
The debate surrounding permit stacking in Bristol Bay reveals
instead how efforts to expand rationalization, whether through
catch-share systems or more circumscribed permit-stacking mea-
sures, place the properties of differing market devices into direct
conﬂict. The material features of the tools that organize Alaska sal-
mon ﬁsheries today, which embed everyday ﬁshing activities in
ownership forms such as boats and permits, create infelicitous
conditions for further rationalization designs. This becomes evi-
dent upon closer analysis of the nature of Bristol Bay harvesters’
objections to ﬁshery restructuring. Unlike many other ﬁshers
who have protested rights-based regimes (cf. Helgason and Pálsson,
1998, 1997), Bristol Bay permit holders never condemned the ITQ
model as immoral or illegitimate for enclosing a previously common
good. Rather, their opposition to rights-based measures stems less
from a denunciation of private property forms than an attachment
to them. As a decade’s worth of disagreement over permit stacking
suggests, Bristol Bay ﬁshers’ vocal and public rejection of plans to
downsize themselves out of existence has decisively inﬂuenced
recent debates about rationalization and stymied major regulatory
change.
Fishery belonging has long been ﬁgured in terms of property in
Bristol Bay, where hard-fought historical battles for property in the
form of boats and permits contribute to strong attachments to
them today. For much of the industry’s existence, powerful sal-
mon-packing cartels controlled the means of commercial produc-
tion, including boats, gear, and access to markets (Hébert and
Mincyte, 2014). In their reﬂections on the past, older ﬁshers de-
scribe the satisfaction of becoming ‘‘independent ﬁshermen’’
around midcentury, in possession of one’s own boat and gear,
and, later, gaining a ﬁshing permit, which most argue gave the ﬁsh-
ing ﬂeet more power vis-à-vis the processors. To this day, owning a
commercial ﬁshing permit in rural Alaska enables residents to
redistribute wealth and employment opportunities to kith and
kin in communities with limited opportunities for cash income,
and makes possible a livelihood that meshes with subsistence
hunting and gathering practices and other long-valorized pursuits
(Reedy-Maschner, 2007; Langdon, 1991, 1995). Currently, permit
ownership is the chief way salmon ﬁshers exercise claims on the
resource, since the state regulatory process requires permit hold-
ers’ input and engagement. While this by no means ensures ﬁshers
a determining role in salmon policy, they nevertheless have
learned to negotiate the power their propertied position affords.
These attachments are essential to understanding why rational-
ization efforts diverge so markedly in the Alaska salmon setting
versus the Norwegian cod context, even though neither case offers
a textbook example of economists performing their models into
being (see Holm and Nielsen, 2007, 192). Rather, in both Alaska
and Norway, ﬁshing interests expressed an ‘‘allergic reaction’’
(Holm and Nielsen, 2007, 192) to the rights-based model, and state
ofﬁcials formally rejected proposals for rationalization devices that
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quota market, which Holm and Nielsen colorfully equate to a sim-
mering stew, does eventually coalesce in the pot, even if ‘‘it took
much longer than they [economists] expected, and it did not turn
out quite the way they wanted it to’’ (2007, 192). In Bristol Bay,
in contrast, a similar salmon stew does not even make it onto
the burner. The transformation of ﬁshers from workers to owners,
which accompanied the everyday adoption of cod quotas in Nor-
way, resembles a process that began much earlier in Alaska, and
one that ultimately has impeded rather than facilitated rights-
based ﬁsheries restructuring.
On one level, such details might be taken to show simply that
there is more complexity and contingency to the workings of mar-
ket devices than is often presumed. On another level, however,
these ﬁsheries case studies emphasize how market-driven trans-
formation depends on the material interaction of market devices
and a ﬁeld of existing, and indeed historically embedded, mecha-
nisms. The failure of recent rationalization measures in Bristol
Bay illuminates these dynamics by illustrating how historical expe-
rience acts in the present. The example to follow focuses on the
more subtle misﬁrings evident in largely successful efforts to pro-
mote new salmon production paradigms, which highlights the un-
even interplay of cultural forms that accompanies the circulation
of market devices.4. Making way for niche-marketing
4.1. Integrating new standards for specialty salmon
While ongoing clashes have largely scuttled economists and
others’ aims to revolutionize the Alaska salmon ﬁshery through
further rationalization, the production of salmon for growing niche
markets has gained more momentum. Just as regulatory tools like
the stacked permits of a D vessel have materially reconﬁgured the
ﬁshery, so have market devices that embody emergent standards
for salmon products. At the same ﬁsheries meetings in which de-
bates about permit stacking occur, harvesters also proudly discuss
the changes they are making to their operations in order to gener-
ate ‘‘quality’’ salmon. Through infrastructural improvements and
shifts in ﬁshing routines, such as chilling and bleeding the catch,
Bristol Bay producers have sought to achieve emerging industry
best practices in order to tap into higher-margin markets.
This is exempliﬁed by the experience of one Bristol Bay ﬁsher,
who came home from a day at the 2012 Fish Board meeting ener-
gized about installing a new refrigerated seawater system on his
boat. Telling his wife what he had learned from other attendees
about new regional grant and loan programs for vessel upgrades,
he described the price-per-pound increases his ﬁsh would garner
with the addition of a chilling system. When she seemed skeptical
that this investment would be proﬁtable, he quickly clariﬁed that,
‘‘it’s not just about the money.’’ He urged his wife to think of how it
would feel to be generating such a ‘‘good product for the con-
sumer,’’ and how the salmon would look on his boat after the
installation, ‘‘all bright and silver, ﬂoating in the ﬁsh holds.’’ These
comments point to the powerful role that the increasingly cele-
brated picture of quality salmon plays in inspiring and arranging
economic change in the Bristol Bay ﬁshery, as well as its success
in transforming industry meanings, values, and norms.
In this section, I describe the turn to quality that has swept the
Bristol Bay salmon ﬁshery over the past decade and the market de-
vices that have shaped its rise, as well as some of their less antic-
ipated consequences. Salmon sold in specialty markets—that
which is natural, wild, sustainable, socially responsible, and rich
in Omega 3 fatty acids, among other distinguishing attributes—re-
ﬂects the range of characteristics associated with seafood quality,an often ambiguous concept that can encompass contradictory ide-
als (Mansﬁeld, 2003, 10). With its array of ﬁne-grained selling
points, specialty salmon is a prime example of the larger ‘‘quality
turn’’ reorienting countless agro-food industries (Goodman, 2003;
Murdoch et al., 2000), as well as what Callon terms qualiﬁcation,
the process through which particular qualities become stabilized
and attached to things, as when products are positioned in markets
(Callon et al., 2002, 199). Yet quality holds a narrower meaning in
salmon industry parlance as well, referring to a more technical set
of speciﬁcations geared to producing regular, unblemished prod-
ucts through particular harvesting and processing practices. As I
explore below and elsewhere at length (Hébert, 2010), the pursuit
of quality salmon entails, somewhat paradoxically, the broad
application of standards to cultivate singularity.
Looking closely at the everyday tools through which quality is
performed provides a clearer picture of what salmon quality means
and how it might be achieved. In the salmon industry workshops of
the early to mid-2000s, one of the more captivating visuals pre-
sented by consultants was that of the quality ﬁllet. While the par-
ticular photographs illustrating this powerful market device
varied, they all displayed a consistent picture: taut, glistening,
and, above all, ﬂawless red ﬂesh, condensed into a precisely por-
tioned form. Consistency was in fact a large part of what workshop
presenters enlisted this image to drive home. They stressed that
only those producers who reliably generated this unmarred vision
of quality could enter into expanding market niches for specialty
seafood, which promised higher prices for wild, sustainably har-
vested ﬁsh—and a glimmer of hope for rural ﬁshers. Quality spec-
iﬁcations thus bundle a range of distinct attributes, such as
predictability, freshness, and ﬂawlessness, which merge in the
material form of the quality ﬁllet.
In workshop settings, images of quality products were typically
shown juxtaposed to those of salmon whose ﬂesh appeared
bruised, mushy, and battered, with separations in the tissue known
as gaping. Presenters explained that these blemishes indicate how
ﬁsh was handled: Bruising can develop when salmon are thrown
on deck, picked up by the tail, or crushed awaiting delivery, while
gaping is more likely to occur in ﬁsh that are not immediately
chilled upon harvest. As a result, campaigns for quality focus on
promoting icing, bleeding, and handling salmon gently, along with
faster deliveries from boats to processors.
Since the early 2000s, Alaska’s salmon has made signiﬁcant in-
roads into the more proﬁtable market segments that quality pro-
grams target, such as high-end domestic markets for fresh and
frozen ﬁllets (Knapp, 2013). In Bristol Bay, rates of ﬁsh chilling
and other indices of quality production have been steadily increas-
ing, with 2012 marking the ﬁrst year that more than half of the
catch was chilled (Northern Economics, 2013). As illustrated by
the Naknek ﬁsher’s eagerness to remake his operation into a qual-
ity-oriented enterprise, this market-driven path to industry recov-
ery appeals to many industry participants in Bristol Bay. Some
smaller processing companies only purchase salmon that has been
iced and bled, while all the major ﬁsh buyers in the Bay have insti-
tuted various quality requirements and inducements to ensure a
steady supply of ‘‘number 1s,’’ or top-graded ﬁsh, for expanded ﬁl-
let lines. These include limits on how many pounds of salmon can
be delivered in a single transport bag without price penalties, and
price premiums for chilled ﬁsh. Regional ﬁshing organizations are
also working to capitalize on quality, laying the groundwork for a
quality-certiﬁed, Bristol Bay salmon brand.
As some of these details suggest, the integration of novel quality
standards into Bristol Bay salmon production is remaking not just
boat decks and ﬁsh holds, but also how salmon ﬁshing is imagined,
performed, and valued. In fact, stimulating such conceptual
changes was often the express purpose of quality trainings. Beyond
calling for structural changes to ﬁshing operations, quality guide-
7 Work by Marianne Lien and Law (2011) explores this dynamic from the
aquaculture side. Industry experts who research and consult across the farmed and
wild salmon sectors help to facilitate this close relationship.
8 Even if ‘‘the consumer’’ of certain species of salmon sold in the domestic market
may be statistically more likely to be a restaurant-goer in a major urban metropolis
(see Knapp et al., 2007), discussions in rural Alaska often ﬁgured the ideal-typical
buyer as a housewife in a smaller city outside the Paciﬁc Northwest, a region
recognized as atypical in the wider US context because of its residents’ familiarity
with salmon.
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ness in their usual ﬁshing work. Trainings like those offered online
by the state’s seafood marketing agency encourage harvesters to
visualize their salmon’s ultimate destination on a distant con-
sumer’s dinner plate as a way to inspire a commitment to icing,
bleeding, and delicate handling (ASMI, 2013). Yet the results of
such conceptual exercises are more multivalent than the mere
implementation of new industry best practices.
4.2. Foiled by the ﬁshery
Despite the broad acceptance of quality training messages, the
integration of these production techniques has not been simple
or straightforward for many Bristol Bay harvesters. For one, the
directives often contrast sharply with the methods and ethos that
characterized ﬁshing in the past. With the Bay’s huge salmon runs,
massive catches have long been a source of renown for ﬁshers,
many of whom still size up their own status by comparing catch
poundage. However, as indicated by recent weight restrictions on
the individual bags used for salmon deliveries, longtime symbols
of ﬁshing prowess are now frowned upon or forbidden.
Further, even concerted efforts to achieve quality can be under-
mined by the intractable conditions of Bristol Bay ﬁshing. Fishers
who take considerable time and money to bleed and chill their
catch ﬁnd that it sometimes displays bruising or gaping nonethe-
less, meriting only a ‘‘number 2’’ grade or lower. Slush bags used
for ice can be ‘‘a pain’’ to integrate, and various practicalities occa-
sionally necessitate the quality-killing practice of round hauling,
pulling in an entire net full of ﬁsh and piling it on deck. Despite
a great deal of work to ensure otherwise, Bristol Bay salmon are
sometimes still tossed, crushed, and left unrefrigerated for long
stretches while frenetic peak-season ﬁshing continues.
Given how fundamental features of the Bristol Bay ﬁshery con-
found even basic attempts at achieving quality, it should come as
no surprise that the quality model originates in a very different sal-
mon-production context. As industry insiders made explicit in har-
vester trainings, it was in fact salmon farming that had set the bar
for quality, despite its viliﬁcation as socially and environmentally
irresponsible by many wild salmon producers in Alaska. During
the workshops in which Bristol Bay ﬁshers and I learned about
these farming operations, we saw how the quality practices that
are often so difﬁcult to integrate in wild ﬁsheries are folded into
the basic structure of industrial aquaculture, particularly in
state-of-the-art plants. In the large facilities that now line the
southern coast of Chile, salmon are hatched year-round in
freshwater tanks and then reared in contained marine net pens
known as ‘‘growout sites.’’ When the ﬁsh reach a predetermined
‘‘market size,’’ they are whisked live via suctioned tubes into
nearby processing facilities, where they are made into fresh and
frozen products, like individually wrapped ﬁllets, sold directly to
end consumers (Knapp, 2002a).
As University of Alaska ﬁsheries economist Gunnar Knapp has
argued, not infrequently within the context of salmon industry
workshops themselves, the success of aquaculture has resulted in
both opportunities and hurdles for Alaskan producers. It has cre-
ated new potential consumers in its dramatic expansion of salmon
markets, but at the same time it has set expectations for a very dif-
ferent sort of salmon product (2002a). Insofar as farming has estab-
lished a model of consistent, unblemished fresh and frozen salmon
available in predictable quantities regardless of the season, it rep-
resents a formidable ‘‘new challenge for wild ﬁsheries’’ (Knapp,
2002b).
Shaped by the ascendancy of aquaculture, the quality salmon
paradigm shows how market devices incorporate elements partic-
ular to certain production contexts, which are then transported to
others through capitalist competition. In the case of salmon, thefarmed and wild sectors, often understood as oppositional rivals,
also operate as constantly evolving models for one another.7 The
entire aquaculture process has been engineered to mimic the life cy-
cle of anadromous salmon in a wild ﬁshery, with its freshwater and
marine phases, albeit in as protected and controlled an environment
as possible (Knapp et al., 2007, 58–59). Farmed salmon is even dyed
with colorants added to its feed so that it mirrors the redder appear-
ance of wild ﬁsh ﬂesh, which develops as salmon eat colorful sea
organisms such as krill. The infamous SalmoFan™ allows
aquaculturists to pick their product color from a collapsible fan of
commercially available options, like a household paint. Yet the wild
salmon industry participates in step with the farmed sector in these
commodity-making dynamics, even if its products are marketed as
uncontaminated by human manipulation or commercial logics. In
order to compete in altered seafood markets and distinguish its
products as superior, the wild salmon industry reproduces
quality norms set largely by the farmed salmon industry (Hébert,
2010).
4.3. Reinvention’s unexpected routes
As the above discussion suggests, the ecological particularities
of the Bristol Bay salmon run and the industry ethos that has devel-
oped around it often block or disrupt plans to recreate the ﬁshery
along quality lines. To the extent that emerging standards pose
new barriers to market entry for rural producers, the experience
of Alaskan ﬁshers parallels that of many small-scale farmers in
the organic and Fair Trade sectors (Freidberg, 2004; Mutersbaugh,
2005; Getz and Shreck, 2006). But even when transformations
spurred by quality initiatives are successfully executed in Bristol
Bay, they do not always unfold smoothly. Residents’ efforts to cater
to fast-expanding domestic markets in fresh and frozen salmon of-
fer a revealing case in point. The reﬂexive processes spurred by
these initiatives lend indeterminacy to market reorderings, espe-
cially when commodity chains connect very different sets of pro-
ducers and consumers, and market devices are intimately
enmeshed with embodied activities like working and eating.
Insofar as ﬁshery participants understand quality as a way to
meet perceived consumer preferences, consumption becomes
objectiﬁed and visible in new ways, and with unexpected effects.
While quality trainings encourage ﬁshers to picture themselves
in the shoes of end consumers, this mental exercise often reminds
rural producers of the gulfs of meaning and experience that sepa-
rate disparate salmon spheres. For example, in one industry work-
shop, a few presenters, owners of specialty seafood processing
companies, introduced Bristol Bay ﬁshers to a number of their
products-in-development and asked for feedback. One ﬁsher was
midway through an assessment of some salmon patties, which
most in the room thought were far too dry, when she stopped her-
self. She explained to the presenters that despite the residents’ col-
lective expertise in salmon, she and the rest of the group might not
be the most helpful critics: They no doubt had very different tastes
from the housewives of Peoria, she noted, invoking the image of
the generic US food shopper who typically populated industry con-
versations.8 The room laughed along with her when she remarked
that, given their love of ‘‘Native food,’’ ‘‘we like stuff oily—we love
it when the grease is rolling down our chins.’’
28 K. Hébert / Geoforum 53 (2014) 21–30As these comments indicate, the process of squaring quality vi-
sions across geographical and cultural divides is much bumpier
than surface details about industry transformation might suggest.
Although the idea of producing worthy salmon for appreciative
consumers appeals to many in rural Alaska, what this actually
means and how it might best be cultivated is much less clear.
The emergent consumer-centered production paradigms and de-
vices such as the quality ﬁllet or the specialty salmon patty prompt
rural producers to recognize the distinctiveness of their own con-
sumption practices as they keep in mind the tastes of others.
This was especially the case in Bristol Bay, where salmon is ea-
ten widely, regularly, and enthusiastically, and conceived of as cen-
tral to Alaska Native identity. For producers seeking to service new
market niches, it was quickly apparent that even as ‘‘traditional’’ or
‘‘artisanal’’ modes of ﬁshing and processing are celebrated by spe-
cialty salmon rhetoric, their actual practices are not always easy to
accord with procedures pioneered on salmon farms and geared to-
ward the dining habits of those who know salmon as a shrink-
wrapped ﬁllet of farmed ﬁsh, pin bones removed. While local no-
tions of quality are not necessarily opposed to new industry norms,
they are not the same either. In Bristol Bay, salmon are ‘‘put up,’’
meaning cut, dried, and smoked, according to family recipes. Fish
head soup is a local favorite, and many relish the delicacy of stinky
heads, salmon that is fermented by being buried in the ground.
Standard local salmon fare—served without particular aversion to
and often with great appreciation for elements like grease, skin,
bones, heads, and eyeballs, for example—speaks to a different mod-
el of excellence than that which deﬁnes industry quality standards.
Transforming rural Alaskan production to meet the quality ideal
and cater to the presumed tastes of distant others thus requires
ongoing reﬂections upon and modiﬁcations to existing practices.
As the same workshop participant who panned the salmon patties
observed, traditional practices could only be enlisted in such ef-
forts if they were substantially altered. For example, she described
how it was nearly impossible for region residents to make their
backyard ﬁsh-processing arrangements into legal businesses, given
that smoked ﬁsh—at least that prepared ‘‘the old way,’’ in Yup’ik
Eskimo fashion—was not cooked at a high enough heat to meet
federal standards. However, such challenges do not spell the end
of longtime salmon recipes or the wholesale triumph of an alien
market model. Rather, as the proprietor of another local salmon
processing business noted, adjusting to the changing demands of
commercial production means that household recipes are
‘‘adapted’’ for industrial equipment, food safety regulations, and
the imagined tastes of others. Indeed, this rural entrepreneur pro-
duced salmon for sale on the East Coast by adjusting her smoke-
house salmon recipe to the cooking requirements of commercial
machinery and adding brown sugar to give the ﬁsh a sweeter
ﬂavor.
Through such adaptations, Bristol Bay producers selectively
incorporate market information to transform their everyday work,
furthering broader shifts in economic organization in so doing. Yet
as they tinker with readily available materials, practices, and rela-
tions to meet quality salmon designs, they negotiate and at times
draw from models that retain traces of different histories, applica-
tions, and cultural forms. This helps explain why the reinvention of
the Bristol Bay salmon industry has been marked by so many dif-
ﬁculties and delicate negotiations.
Amid the Bristol Bay ﬁshery’s turn to quality over the past dec-
ade, these more uncertain moments of industry change are espe-
cially revealing for understanding the role of materiality in the
workings of market devices. Unlike more disembodied technical
speciﬁcations, devices like the quality ﬁllet or the specialty sal-
mon patty reproduce the abstract quality ideal at the same time
they materialize concrete conﬁgurations of production and con-
sumption, in this case those associated with farmed salmon.These model foodstuffs then serve as corporeal benchmarks for
assessing heterogeneous ﬁshing products and practices, tests of
worth that simultaneously class both goods and people (cf. Busch
and Tanaka, 1996; Busch, 2000). Because this demands ongoing
comparisons between quality visions and everyday industry out-
put, the use of market devices in the salmon sector gives Bristol
Bay producers regular opportunities to reﬂect on the gaps that
separate the device and the means of realizing it with existing
conditions in their rural ﬁshery. Insofar as the circulation of these
market tools spurs creative responses among producers, it raises
the possibility that practices of adaptation and adjustment
may shape quality designs themselves, and thus reﬁgure market
devices in so doing.5. Conclusion
As evidenced by the Bristol Bay industry’s recovery measures,
market devices poised to reorder economic life often circulate in
the form of particular market objects. From the interchangeable
units of ﬁsh poundage that serve as the basis for rights-based quota
plans to the gleaming, crimson ﬁllets that set the terms for quality
standards, market objects not only beckon with luminous visions
of another economic order—in this case, a more streamlined, efﬁ-
cient, and proﬁtable one—but also provide the framework for real-
izing this through more mundane activities, be they icing or
bleeding recently caught salmon, or inputting data into a ﬁsheries
catch-share plan. Yet these devices do not always usher in the
transformations they were designed to facilitate, and even when
they do work it is rarely according to plan or without hiccups. Fish
already calculated through biological balance sheets are rejected
for further rationalization because of their entanglement in exist-
ing market devices, such as property in ﬁshing vessels and permits;
and quality initiatives are foiled on occasion by unruly ﬁshery
dynamics and provoke unexpected outcomes. These include the
explicit questioning of quality standards themselves, and their ful-
ﬁllment through more circuitous and less certain means. This arti-
cle has explored how these adoptions and disruptions are
inﬂuenced by the materiality of market devices and the embodied
interplay between their properties and the often-uneven worldly
conditions they are intended to smooth.
Given the divergent fates of the industry recovery proposals de-
scribed here, the Bristol Bay case presents an instructive site for
examining the workings of market devices because it shows both
their transformative power as well as their limits. Largely unsuc-
cessful efforts to reorder the salmon ﬁshery through rights-based
schemes provide a stark example of the failures of certain market
instruments to bring into being the phenomena their models take
for granted. When compared to the different outcomes of other
ﬁsheries facing rationalization, the Bristol Bay example sheds light
on the circumstances under which performativity becomes possi-
ble. Conditions in the Alaska salmon sector prove infelicitous for
adopting rights-based measures because of what Asdal and Moser
describe as ‘‘layers of history. . .folded into the new’’ (2012, 295),
even though it also resembles other ﬁsheries in which rationaliza-
tion has been more fully realized. This underscores that market de-
vices must be assessed in their interactions with the wider
landscape of tools that contour existing arrangements. The same
point is exempliﬁed by the somewhat more successful reorganiza-
tion of the Bristol Bay ﬁshery to supply markets for quality salmon.
Here, the way new market norms are integrated into everyday
work highlights the possibility that reorderings may not unfold
as intended and that models themselves may be altered in the
process.
The Bristol Bay salmon ﬁshery’s experiences with rationaliza-
tion and niche-marketing efforts underscore the signiﬁcance of
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while they also emphasize the central role played by elements that
might otherwise be glossed as history, culture, or context. By
attending to how neoliberal economic transformation is made
and remade through the everyday stuff of production and con-
sumption, I show how an analysis of market-driven change might
proceed without assuming its endpoints in advance. Taking stock
of salmon from the vantage of southwest Alaska ultimately reveals
not simply how wild, corporeal qualities can gum up the mechan-
ics of market devices, but, more pointedly, how indeterminacy is
embedded within the workings of markets themselves.
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